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Abstract
This research project examines the hypothesis that democracy and political stability have
significant effects on economic growth in developing countries. Previous empirical
studies find rather ambiguous results when testing for the relationship between
democracy and growth. This paper extends these past studies by focusing on the effects
of democracy and political stability in developing countries. It also attempts to
differentiate the effects of political stability and democracy on economic growth. The
results suggest that democracy has a negative effect on economic growth. However the
results also suggest that political stability regardless of the level of democracy has the
greatest effect on a countries economic growth.
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I) INTRODUCTION
Many studies have been conducted on the relationship between democracy and
growth. The general understanding of the relationship between economic growth and
democracy is that democracy fosters economic growth relative to non-democracies in a
given country. Nevertheless this theory has come under the scrutiny of many economists,
who point out that countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, which achieved
'super growth' regardless ofthe fact that the governments of these countries are
authoritarian in nature (Nelson and Singh 1998). However, the results of statistical
studies conducted on this subject have been rather inconclusive. This paper argues that
such inconclusive results stem from using reduced form models that pool data from
developing and developed countries. This paper focuses on only developing countries to
test the hypothesis that democracy can have a negative effect on their economic growth
and that it is political stability regardless of the extent of democracy that would have the
most significant effect on growth in dev~loping countries.
Economic growth and Democracy are two terms that have often been heard used
in the same context by public commentators, politicians, and popular media. Thus we are
often faced with the question of whether the theory that democracy fosters economic
growth is simply the wishful thinking of people who value both democracy and growth.
The importance oflooking at this question in greater detail lies in the fact that it is a key
policy question for many international aid institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.
This issue is particularly important to many developing countries due to the fact that one
of the most important preconditions towards obtaining aid from these institutions is
political liberalization. Thus, are policies of western countries that encourage the
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installation of democracy to spur economic growth in countries like Somalia and Haiti of
any practical use?
In many developing countries political liberalization can lead to economic

policies that are detrimental to economic growth. As an example, countries that have a
greater level of political freedom may not implement policies such as trade liberalization
that could have a beneficial effect on growth. This can be illustrated by examining the
situation that South Korea faced during the late 1980's when its government tried to
move towards not only greater political freedom but also economic freedom. Thus with
democratization in full swing, Korean interest groups, such as the farmers, agitated
against free market policies, such as import liberalization, preventing the existing
government from implementing free market policies.
Therefore, I will approach this topic by first looking at some of the theories and
important literature pertaining to how democracy affects growth. In this section I shall
also review some of the shortcomings of previous empirical studies with reference to this
\

subject. The subsequent section lays out the four hypotheses relating the effect of the
political variables used in this paper on economic growth. Section IV explains the data
sets that are used to estimate the relevant hypotheses. Sections V and VI explore how
democracy, political stability, economic growth and government effectiveness affect
economic growth through their influence on variables such as investment, human capital,
and government spending. This model, which is referred to as the 'indirect/direct effects
model' estimates the direct and indirect effects that political stability and electoral system
have on the rate of economic growth. In the results section, I will present the results of
my empirical model and compare these results, with the results that I expected from
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previous research. I will also discuss in this section the reasons why the results of certain
explanatory variables differ from what was predicted by my model. And finally, I will
conclude my paper by summing up what the important results of this study are and how
these results apply to important policy choices made by governments and aid-institutions.

II) LITERATURE REVIEW
In the current literature there are two broadly opposing views pertaining to this link

between growth and the degree of democracy, the "comparability perspective" and the
"conflict perspective" (De Haan and Siermann, 1995) The 'comparability perspective' is
espoused by a school of economists and political scientists that maintains that democracy
has a beneficial effect on growth both directly and indirectly. On the other hand, the
conflict perspective is defended by a second school of thought that maintains that
democracy has an adverse effect on growth. Defenders of the conflict perspective point to
countries such as Hong Kong,

Singapor~

and Taiwan, which achieved "super growth"

regardless of the fact that the governments of these countries were authoritarian in nature
(Nelson and Singh 1998). On the other hand, others point to the dismal performance of
economies in authoritarian regimes in many African countries. The Economist states, "If
dictators made countries rich, Africa would be an economic colossus" (Nelson and
Singh, 1998). The arguments between these two views follow along the lines of which
regime can maintain property rights, curtail current consumption, and implement timely
and appropriate economic policies that both lead to and sustain growth.
Proponents of the comparability perspective argue that democratic institutions
create a system of checks and balances that effectively control governmental power and
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limit the potential for the implementation of unpopular policies. Secondly, it has also
been argued that democracies are better able to protect private property, which many
economists claim to be the "foundation of material progress" (De Haan and Siermann
1996). Also, human capital is another channel through which democracy could effect
growth as democracies give greater weight towards the basic needs of the public.
Barro(l996), in his empirical study investigating the relationship between democracy and
economic growth, finds a non linear relationship in which more democracy enhances
growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth once a moderate level of
political freedom has been achieved.
Development requires large amounts of investment that requires substitution away
from current consumption. Thus, proponents of the conflict perspective are wont to argue
that a democratic government is unable to implement such policies for fear of being voted
out of office. It has been stated that, "Such investment programs imply cuts in current
consumption that would be painful at t~ low levels of living that exist in almost all
developing countries ...No political party can hope to win a democratic election on the
platform of current sacrifices for a bright future" (przeworski and Limongi, 1993).
Authoritarian regimes have more centralized power with which to "orchestrate economic
growth" than democracies, particularly in developing countries (Minier 1998). Neither is
there a principle that claims that non-democratic governments cannot maintain private
property. On the other hand, it has been argued by przeworski and Limongi that
democracies in developing countries may actually have an adverse effect on private
property rights: "Democracy offers those who are poor, oppressed or otherwise miserable
a consequence of the initial endowments an opportunity to redress via the state. Endowed
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with political power in the form of universal suffrage, those who suffer as a consequence
ofprivate property will attempt to use this power to expropriate the riches ...The
widespread usage of democracy as a 'proxy' for guarantees of property rights .. .is thus
unjustifiable" (przeworski and Limongi 1993).

Previous empirical studies
In conclusion it can simply be stated that the relationship between the extent of

democracy and economic growth has, at best, been ambiguous. A survey article written
by przeworski and Limongi on the supposed link between democracy and economic
freedom reports that out of 18 studies surveyed, only 7 found statistically significant
relationships.( Przeworski and Limongi 1993) Another survey conducted by Bomer
reports that out of 16 empirical studies conducted on this link, only 3 had a positive and
relatively robust association between democracy and growth. Also, three of these
empirical studies discovered a negative \ association between these two variables, whilst
the remaining 10 had ambiguous results (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001). Such results have
led some economists to subscribe to what Haan and Siermann call the "skeptical view".
This view doubts the existence of a viable statistical relationship between democracy and
economic development. Instead they theorize that the kind of policies that are pursued by
the government, institutional arrangements, and political stability are far more important
than regime type (Haan and Siennann, 1996).
One of the biggest shortcomings of many ofthe studies (Barro,1991; Weede,
1996; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001) conducted on the relationship between democracy
and economic freedom is that they use samples that lump together countries that have
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well developed democratic systems and recently democratized developing countries.

/

Lumping these dissimilar countries together in one study, which is trying to discover the
relationship between democracy and economic growth may result in rather biased results
that indicate democracy as a significant variable that effects growth. As mentioned
before, the importance of a study looking into the relationship between these two
variables is its importance to developing countries. Also in many developing countries,
productivity and democracy seem to come at the expense of each other. Therefore I will
be limiting my sample size to include only developing countries.
Secondly, this paper argues that political stability is not necessarily a function of
democracy. According to Tavares and Wacziarg, one of the characteristics of democracy
is ''transparent rules for the alternation of political forces in power" which discourages
uncertainty. (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001) However, looking at the tyranny of
majoritarian democracies, such as in democratic Sri Lanka, confirms that democracies do
not automatically guarantee political

st~bility (Gupta,

Madhavan, and Blee, 1998).

Therefore, this paper will use political stability as an exogenous variable. This paper
basically puts forward the argument that the linkage between economic growth and
political stability is robust regardless of the form of political regime existing in a given
country.
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III) RESEARCH HYPOTHESES.
The model presented here is an adaptation of the standard neoclassical one-sector
growth model used by Barro in his paper, "Democracy and Growth". This model, like
most models explaining the relationships between democracy and growth (Barro 1990;
Gupta, Dipak, Madhavan and Blee 1998, Tavares and Wacziarg 2001), assumes that that
governments provide law and order, enforce contracts, and defend private parties against
external threats, as well as provide inputs for private production that are not efficiently
supplied through the market. Therefore, these models begin with the assumption that
governments are the locus of decision making, playing a significant role in optimizing
efficiency, growth, and welfare (Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Consequently, it can be
argued that variables such as physical and human capital are affected by the stability and
type of government in a given country. Thus the political dimension that this paper
addresses has been added to the neoclassical growth model using the following variables;
level of democracy, level ofpolitical stability, level of government effectiveness, and
level of economic freedom.

Hypothesis I) - Democracy has a significant negative impact on economic growth in
developing countries.
The importance of the level of democracy can be illustrated using the following
example. Let us first assume that the economy in a given country consists of a number of
rent seeking groups. In a democratic country the government is then controlled by one of
these groups or a coalition of different groups. Such environments automatically promote
rent seeking as the government seeks to satisfy the ruling group or coalition of groups
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with the hopes of gaining or staying in power. It can be stated simply that the government
is selfish, in the sense that it is concerned purely with the welfare of its own members
(Anthony Annett, 2001). The group that the government represents is important as the
government must then choose between consuming or investing in physical capital. Thus
the government faces a trade-off between implementing policies that build political
capital through rent seeking activities that favor current consumption and growth oriented
policies. Thus developing countries with democratic regimes are more likely to promote
consumption at the cost of savings.

Hypothesis II) - Political stability is significant positive determinant of growth.
In this paper, the probability of losing power is associated directly with the degree
of political instability in the country. Such instability can have serious consequences on
economic growth as there is a direct connection between capital flight and political
instability. When a political regime is upstable, saving rates decrease as instability
compels consumers to increase spending as their savings could become worthless.
Savings also become redundant when political instability leads to the displacement of
people, depriving them of a source ofliving. Investors' demand for fixed capital stocks
will also decrease with increasing political instability. Even when investors do invest,
they tend to favor industries and investment opportunities that are liquid and speculative.
Thus, investment in such countries tends towards low productivity industries that are not
capital intensive which would provide the foundation for development. As a result, two
of the most essential factors that sustain economic growth, investment and savings, are
affected adversely by political upheavals (Y.Feng, 2001).

8

•

Hypothesis III) - The level of Economic freedom in a country is an important
determinant of economic growth.
Numerous studies have documented a robust positive effect of economic freedom
on economic growth. Economic freedom can be described simply as a measure that
characterizes the degree to which an economy is a market economy. In other words, it is a
measurement of the ability to enter into voluntary contracts with limited government
intervention in the form of regulation, taxes, and rule of law which upholds contracts and
protects private property (N. Berggren, 2003). So how does economic freedom affect
growth? Economic freedom increases growth through its effects on the neoclassical
growth factors, physical capital and human capital. According to Douglas North, the type
of institutions in place has an important effect on the incentives of economic actors to be
more efficient or inefficient. Thus, theoretically, institutions that promote economic
freedom also have the capacity to promote incentives which in tum promotes
productivity. Consequently, it can be cl~.med that economic freedom has the capacity to
promote efficiency by encouraging competition due to fewer regulations and government
enterprises. It also enables specialization and economies of scale, as economic freedom
"enables talent to be allocated to where it generates the highest value" (N. Berggren,
2003). Thus, economic freedom may constitute an explanatory factor for growth in
developing countries.

9

Hypothesis IV) - Ceteris Paribus the level of Government effectiveness has a positive
effect on economic growth.
It has been argued that the neoclassical result of efficient markets holds up only

when there are no transaction costs. However, when it is costly to transact, then
institutions matter. According to Douglas North, "Institutions form the incentive structure
of a society, and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the
underlying determinants of economic performance" (North, D.C, 1994). Thus, the
government effectiveness indicator denotes the quality of public service provision, the
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to
policies (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004). In other words, government
effectiveness measures the competence of government institutions. Thus, theoretically, if
government institutions were functioning efficiently by reducing the costs of transactions,
there would be an increase in the prod{1ctivity of the neoclassical growth variables. This
in tum would stimulate economic growth.
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IV) DATA.
My model will utilize cross sectional data from 112 developing countries
This study uses data from a number of sources including the 2003 edition of the World
development Indicators, Heritage index, Polity IV project as well as the World Bank
government indicators. My variables measuring the quality of governance such as
political stability and the effectiveness of governance were obtained from the World
Bank government indicators. The variable measuring the level of democracy in each
country was obtained from the Polity IV index. Most of the variables, including growth
and the democracy index, enter as four- five year averages, which limit the potential for
measurement error and business cycle effects driving our results.
The dependent variable used in this paper, GDP_Growth, will be defined as
simply the average annual growth rate in real GDP, expressed as a percentage change in a
countries GDP based on constant 1995 U.S Dollars. This variable has been averaged
between the years 1999 and 2002 to elirv-inate business cycle effects. These particular
years have been chosen as they are more representative of the state of the present-day
world economy and they avoid the effects of the Asian financial crisis. All variables used
in this study are defined in Table 1 along with their means and standard deviation.
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Table 1 -Variable Dermitions
Variables

Type

Standard
Deviation

Mean

GROWTH GDP

Average GDP rates of cOWltries
between the years 1999-2002

2.615

3.063

Political instability between the
years 1998-2002
Level of Democracy between the
years 1998-2002
Level of Economic freedom
between the years 1998-2002
Average of the year 1998-2002

.828

-.332

5.886

2.343

.604

3.2

0.817

-.192

Initial GDP in the year 1998
Average population growth rates
between the years 1999-2002

1.899
.626

23.26
1.902

Average Investment rates in the
years 1998-2002as % of GDP
Illiteracy rates between the years
1990-2001
Average Government spending as
% of GDP between 1998-2002

5.979

21.125

20.144

27.075

5.984

13.784

System variables
POL STABILITY
DEMOCRACY
EC FREEDOM
GOV-EFFECTIVNESS
Other variables
Ln(GDP)
POP GROWTH

Production function
variables
INVESTMENT
ILLIT
GOV CONSUMPTION

This paper seeks to define and calculate the direct and indirect effects of the
extent of democracy and other governance indicators on economic growth. I have used
several distinct measures, which I shall define as system variables to approximate the
effect of decisions made by the government on economic growth. The first system
variable I use is democracy. The indicator for democracy I will be using is complied by
the Polity IV project. In this index democracy consists of three elements: the presence of
institutions and procedures that allow citizens to express effective preferences, existence
of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, and the
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in acts ofpolitical participation (Marshal and
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Jaggers, 2002). On the other hand, an autocracy is defined as a regime that sharply
restricts or suppresses competitive political participation. Thus the democracy index
ranges from a scale of +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic)
The next system variable that I use is an index for political stability compiled by
the World Bank. This index measures the likelihood that the government in power will be
destabilized by unconstitutional means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This
index captures the idea that the likelihood of wrenching changes in government can affect
the quality of governance by affecting the continuity of policies (Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi, 2004).
Next, this paper uses economic freedom as a system variable, because the
openness of an economy depends primarily on the decision of the government. This
variable has been chosen as a system variable since the extent of democracy has little
effect on the openness of an economy. To illustrate, China is totalitarian and India is a
democracy, but they both have roughly the same level of economic freedom. Economic
\

freedom measures the number and/or effectiveness of trade barriers such as trade
restrictions, monetary policy, and restrictions on capital flows and investments in a
particular country.
The final system variable this paper uses is the variable "Government
Effectiveness" made available by the World Bank to indicate the ability of the
government to formulate and implement policies. This variable measures, the quality of
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, and the competency of civil
servants. In other words, this variable measures the government's ability to produce and
implement policies and deliver public goods. Like the democracy index, economic
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freedom index, and the political stability index, this index is also averaged over a period
of5 years.
The production function variables were obtained via The World Development
Indicators. Due to the lack of data for government final consumption in the years 1998
2002, I have used an average of government consumption as a percentage of GDP
between the years 1996-2001. This variable includes all government current expenditures
for purchases of goods and services but excludes expenditures on government capital
formation.
Net investment in physical capital enters this model as an average of the
percentage of GDP between the years 1998-2002. This variable consists of outlays on
additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories.
The final measure I use as a production function variable is a proxy for changes in human
capital formation. For this I have used the average in illiteracy rates between the years
1990 and 2001. Adult literacy rate me~ures basic reading and writing skills of adults and
a portion of these adults then comprise the workforce. The lag in this variable is justified
as it can be argued that human capital does not affect productivity and thereby increase
growth rates instantaneously. Conversely, it must also be pointed out that this measure
captures only very basic skills and may not be the best approximation to capture worker
productivity.
The rest of the independent variables were obtained via The World Development
Indicators as well. To compare results of this regression with that of Robert Harro, I have
used some of the same variables he uses in his estimation of the neoclassical growth
model. Therefore I used the log of initial GDP, in the year 1998 to represent the
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conditional rate of convergence of these developing countries. Next, I use the average of
population growth between the years 1999-2002, to capture the effects of population
growth on economic growth. It has been argued that population growth effects economic
growth by affecting the portion of capital available to each worker. In other words, an
increase in population tends to reduce the share of capital per worker reducing the
marginal productivity of each worker.

V) INDIRECT/ DIRECT AFFECTS MODEL.
This paper will be utilizing an intervening variables framework to examine the
effects of democracy and political stability on economic growth. In this model
background variables such as democracy, political stability, economic freedom, and
government effectiveness can have direct and indirect effects on a countries economic
growth. Diagram 1 shows the above mentioned relationship schematically:
\

~
Background I

Intervening
Variables

~

L....-_v_an_·_a_bl_e_s----'I------------....
~ ~
Figure 1

Thus each of these background variables will exert a direct effect on the GDP
growth in a particular country. However, as mentioned before, this paper hypothesizes
that these variables can affect GDP indirectly by affecting a number of intervening
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variables. As can be seen in Figure 2, political instability, democracy, economic freedom
and government effectiveness can effect growth directly, but they could also affect
growth indirectly by increasing the level of investments in a country, spending on
education, and/or increasing the productivity of physical or human capital

Human

/

Capital

~

/~

.-------------,~ I Investment
Democracy
Political stability
Gov effectiveness
Ec-Freedom

(Direct Effect)

GDP
Growth
'"

Population
growth

Government
spending

\

Figure 2. Illustration of Direct and Indirect Paths

In this model there are 3 paths in which democracy and political instability can
affect the rate of growth. Firstly, it can be argued that political stability has a significant
effect on the level of investment as it increases investor confidence in a particular
country. The effect of democracy on investment is tentative. Tavares and Wacziarg claim
that democracy effect growth is political instability: "Political instability creates an
incentive for rulers to adopt predatory behavior vis-a.-vis the private resources of the
economy". In a democracy such predatory behavior is discouraged due to the fact that
decision making is more open to public debate. This in turn also facilitates a smooth
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transition of power through public elections. Therefore a more stable democratic
government gives investors an assurance of the safety of their investments. On the flip
side in a democratic country where income redistribution is widely endorsed, it is
unlikely that investors will be willing to invest. However, as mentioned earlier,
government effectiveness and economic freedom set up the institutions necessary to
increase the productivity of investment. Trade liberalization and effective government
institutions encourage more secure property rights, thereby increasing investor
confidence.
Human capital is another indirect channel through which democracy affects
growth. As mentioned earlier most democracies place great weight on providing the basic
needs of the public. This leads to higher spending by democracies towards education.
This public funding of education decreases the cost of education, which increases the
number of people who are able to receive an education. This in turn leads to a growth in
human capital, which according to the ~o-c1assical growth model is one of the main
factors that increase the level of growth in an economy. It can also be maintained that
human capital is indirectly affected by instability. According to A. Annett, political
instability leads to higher government consumption aimed simply at reducing the risk of
losing office, thus leaving little room to spend on human capital development (Annett,
2001). Conversely, economic freedom and government effectiveness promote human
capital development as they encourage specialization, thereby increasing the productivity
of human capital.
The third path shows the indirect effect democracy and political instability have
on economic growth via government spending. The reason for this lies in the fact that the
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larger the size of the government, the larger the costs that the government accrues, which
leads to a lower fiscal residuum. A fiscal residuum is the property of the citizens of that
country, meaning that no member of the government can use it for private purposes.
Przeworski and Limongi maintain that who has rights to the fiscal residuum depends
largely on the type of regime. In a democracy citizens have the right to decide the size of
the government and have the right to the fiscal residuum (przeworski and Limongi,
1993). Therefore, a democracy that gives more influence to the poor in policy making has
a tendency to increase government interventions for such purposes as income
redistribution funded by higher taxation. The implementation and administration of such
policies requires a large government. This leads to increased government spending which
has adverse affects on growth. Political instability also increases government spending
which is aimed at placating the opposition.
Thus this paper hypothesizes that democracy and political instability have both
direct and indirect effects on the rate Qf growth achievable by a country. The estimation
of direct and indirect effects of the background variables on economic growth involves
estimating several OLS regression models. The first is the background model, which
regresses growth against four political background variables.

Equation 1: Background Model
GROWTH_GDP = al + Jh (DEMOCRACY) + P3 (POL_STABILITY) +
P4(EC_FREEDOM) + Ps(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS)
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Next, we regress economic growth against the four background variables and the 6
intervening variables.
Equation 2: Overall Model
GROWTH_GDP = 0.2 + 1321 (POL_STABILITY) + P22(DEMOCRACY) +
P23(EC_FREEDOM) + P24(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS) + P2s(INVESTMENT) +
P26(Ln GDP) + P27(POP_GROWTH) + P2s(ILLIT) + P29(GOV_SPENDING) +
P30(EC_FREEDOM)
After estimating the background and overall models, 4 auxiliary OLS regressions
are run for the intervening variables. These are necessary to determine how the two
background variables influence each of the intervening variables.

Auxiliary Equations for Intervening Variables:
Equation 3
INVESTMENT = 0.3 + P31(pOL_STABILITy) + P32(DEMOCRACy) +
P33(EC_FREDOM) + P34(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS)
Equation 4
\

ILLIT = a.. + P41(pOL_STABILITy) + P42(DEMOCRACy) + P43(EC_FREDOM) +
P44(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS)
Equation 5
GOV_SPENDING = as + PSl(pOL_STABILITY) + Ps2(DEMOCRACy) +
PS3(EC_FREDOM) + PS4(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS)

To illustrate how these models can be used to evaluate the total, direct, and
indirect effects of democracy and political instability on GROWTH_GDP, let us look at
the effects of a change in (POL_STABILITY) on GROWTH_GDP. By taking the total
derivative of the overall model with respect to political instability, we can isolate the
direct and indirect effects.
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Equation 6
(~GROWTH_GDP/~POL_STABILITY)

= (OGROWTH_GDPIBPOL_STABILITY) +

(OGROWTH_GDPI BINVESTMENT) * (BINVESTMENTIBPOL_STABILITy) +
(BGROWTH_GDPIBILLIT) * (BILLITIBPOL_STABILITY) +
(BGROWTH_GDPIBGOV_SPENDING) * (BGOV_SPENDINGIBPOL_STABILITy)

The derivative on the left hand side represents the total effect of a change in
political instability on GDP growth. The first partial derivative on the right hand side of the
equation, (BGROWTH_GDPIBPOL_STABILITY), represents the direct effect (~21)' The
products that follow this direct effect correspond to an indirect effect through each
particular intervening variable, and the sum of these is the total indirect effect. The first
tenn, (BGROWTH_GDPI BINVESTMENT), is the coefficient of that particular intervening
variable on GDP growth (~25)' The next tenn, (BINVESTMENTIBPOL_STABILITY),
represents the coefficient of the relevant background variable and the intervening variable
\

(~31)'

The product of these two coefficients serves as an estimate of the indirect effect of

political instability through the intervening variable, investment. The remaining indirect
effects are computed in a similar manner. The sum of the four indirect effects is the total
indirect effect.
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VI) RESULTS
The results and findings of direct and indirect effects discussed above are
presented in this section. Table 3 presents the results ofthe OLS regression estimation of
GROWTH_GDP for the background model and the overall model. The background
model, as mentioned above, includes only democracy, political stability, economic
freedom, and government effectiveness as independent variables. The overall model adds
the remaining independent variables to the background model.
Table 3 - Regression Estimates ofGROWTH_GDP

Variables

Background
Model

Overall Model

Constant

.563
(.329)
-.085
(-1.76)*
.487
(1.44)
.951
(1.79)*
.685
(1.86)*

.544
(.108)
-.077
(-1.49)
.651
(2.00)**
-.106
(-.178)
.464
(1.205)
.018
(.113)
-.440
(-.829)
0.150
(3.29)***
0.050
(2.96)***
-0.059
(-1.31)*
.255
81

DEMOCRACY

GOv_EFFEVTIVNESS

EC]REEDOM

POL STABILITY

Ln (GDP)

INVESTMENT

ILLITERACY

GOVSPENDING

AdjustedR2
Sample Size

.071
91

,

Note: * Indicates significance at the .10 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level;
and *** indicates significance at the .01 level.
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Including political stability, democracy, economic freedom and government
effectiveness in the background regression (Table 3) produced a large and significant
coefficient for POL_STABILITY, DEMOCRACY and EC_FREEDOM. These
coefficients represent the "total effects" of these political variables on growth in the
direct/indirect model. All three of the results are consistent with the hypotheses stated
earlier. They suggest that political stability and economic freedom lead to higher growth
rates, and that democracy leads to lower growth rates. The coefficient for government
effectiveness, however, was insignificant even though it proved to have the correct sign.
Subsequently, the overall model was estimated after controlling for the three
intervening variables, initial GDP and population growth (Table 3). Recall that the
coefficients to the four political variables in the overall model are the "direct effects" of
these variables on economic growth. In the overall model the coefficient for political
stability, democracy, and economic freedom was insignificant, even though they proved
to have the predicted sign. On the oth~ hand, GOV_EFFECTIVENESS, which had been
insignificant in the background model, turned out to be significant. The variables
Ln(GDP), Ln(POP_GROWTH) and intervening variable GOV_SPENDING have the
correct sign but prove to be insignificant. The coefficient for the intervening variables
INVESTMENT was significant with the correct sign.
The theory presented in Section II leads us to the hypothesis that an increase in
human capital will increase the productivity of existing inputs, thereby increasing growth
rates. llliteracy rates were used as a proxy for human capital. However, the results show
that the proxy for human capital, ILLIT, has an unexpected positive sign, suggesting that
greater illiteracy leads to higher growth. Initially this unexpected result was attributed to
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using the wrong proxy. However, even when other proxies for human capital were used,
such as literacy rates, government spending on education, and the HDI education index,
there was, in every case, an unexpected inverse relationship between human capital and
growth rates.
Conventional wisdom maintains that "The education and training of men and of
women contributed directly to economic growth through its effects on productivity,
earnings, job mobility, entrepreneurial skills, and technological innovation" (Easterly,
W.72). However, in William Easterly's article "Educated for what?" Easterly points out a
number of reasons as to why educational expansion in developing countries has had
distinctly disappointing results. First, he argues that schooling pays off only when
government actions create incentives for growth rather than redistribution: "In an
economy with extensive government intervention, the activity with the highest returns to
skills might be lobbying the government for favors." Finally, he also claims that in a
country with an economy which creates no incentives to invest in the future,
\

administrative targets for "universal primary education" are of little value to growth (W.
Easterly).
The regression analysis was also carried out separately for each of the intervening
variables to estimate the effects of the background variables on the intervening variables.
The auxiliary regression results for the 3 intervening variables appear in Table 4. The
results in this table have been obtained by regressing the three intervening variables
(INVESTMENT, GOV_SPENDING and ILLIT) against each of the four background
variables (DEMOCRACY, POL_STABILITY, EC_FREEDOM and
GOV_EFFECTIVENESS.) \

23

Only POL_STABILITY and EC_FREEDOM had significant coefficients in the

three auxiliary equations. POL_STABILITY had the expected significant effect on
INVESTMENT but had an unexpected and significant positive effect on government
spending. EC_FREEDOM has one significant coefficient in the 3 auxiliary regressions
(Table 4). Thus, EC_FREEDOM had a large, unexpected and significant negative effect
on ILLIT.
Table 4 - Regressions of the four intervening variables on background variables
DEMOCRACY and POL STABILITY.
Variable

INVESTMENT

GOV SPENDING

ILLIT

Constant

20.272

17.842

-8.424

(4.716)***

(-4.552)***

(-.645)

0.004

-0.124

-.519

(.032)

(-1.098)

(-1.408)

0.207

2.854

(-1.205)

(.269)

(1.104)

0.436

-0.976

11.460***

(.328)

(-.805)

(2.829)

1.893

1.617

-2.666

(2.041)**

(1.904)*

(-.937)

Adjusted R2

.02

.035

.170

Sample Size

90

89

86

DEMOCRACY

GOV_EFFECTIVENESS

EC]REEDOM

POLITICAL STABILITY

-1.014

,

Note: * Indicates significance at the .10 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level;
and *** indicates significance at the .01 level.
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There are several results in the auxiliary regressions that deserve note. First
economic freedom had a rather surprising effect on illiteracy rates, as the coefficient
shows an unexpected positive sign, suggesting that greater economic freedom would lead
to higher illiteracy rates. Second, as hypothesized, political stability had a positive effect
on investment. The countries in our sample that had greater political stability were much
more likely to attract greater investment. This result is consistent with the earlier work of
y. Feng (2001). Third, political stability unexpectedly increases government spending.

All three of these results imply that there could be significant indirect effects since
economic freedom and political stability both influence intervening variables.
To determine the magnitude of the Total, direct and indirect effects of political
background variables on economic growth, this paper followed the procedure described
in Section V. The results are presented in Table 5. The ''total effect" of each background
variable on GROWTH GDP is the coefficients of each of these variables in the
''background model" presented in Table 3. Recall that this model includes only the four
\

political variables but not the three intervening variables. Therefore, the total effect
should be interpreted as the influence of each political variable on the growth rates of a
country after controlling for the effects of the other political variables.
The direct effects reported in Table 5 are the effects of each political background
variable on GROWTH_GDP after controlling for all other political variables and the
intervening variables. Each of the direct effects is the coefficient to the background
variables (DEMOCRACY, POL_STABILITY, EC_GROWTH and
GOV_EFFECTIVENESS) in the overall model presented in Table 3. The indirect effects
in Table 5 are the total effects minus the direct effects.
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Table 5- Total, Direct and Indirect Effects of Background Variables DEMOCRACY and
POL- STABILITY on GROWTH- GDP.
Background
Variable

Total Effects

Direct Effects

Indirect Effects

DEMOCRACY

-0.085

-0.077

-0.008

(-1.761)*

(-1.491)

GOV EFFECTIVENESS

0.487

0.651

-0.164

EC]REEDOM

(1.443)
0.951
(1.787)*

(2.000)*
-0.106
(-.178)

1.057

POL_STABILITY

0.685

0.464

0.221

(1.860)*

(1.205)

91

85

Sample Size

Note: * Indicates significance at the .10 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level;
and *** indicates significance at the .01 level.

As mentioned above, each indirect effect reported in Table 5 consists of the sum

,

of three paths. The indirect effect paths are computed from the coefficient in the auxiliary
regressions and the overall model. Each indirect effect can be thought of as the total
influence of the political variables on GROWTH_GDP through the intervening variables.
For example, the indirect effect of political stability on growth is the sum of the indirect
effects of POL_STABILITY on GROWTH_GDP through INVESTMENT, ILLIT, and
GOV SPENDING. As can be seen in Table 5 there are only two significant indirect
effects on EC_GROWTH. Each of these significant indirect effects are computed as the
product of the coefficient to the POL_STABILITY and EC_FREEDOM variables found
in the appropriate auxiliary regression in Table 4 multiplied by the intervening variable
coefficient from the overall model in Table 3. Table 6 presents the computed indirect
effects.
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Table 6 - Estimated Indirect Effects of Political Stability and Economic Freedom
Variables on GROWTH_GDP through Intervening Variables*

ILLIT

Background
Variable

INVESTMENT

GOV-SPENDING

EC]REEDOM

N/A

N/A

0.576

0.284

-0.097

N/A

The subsequent paragraphs examine the total, direct, and indirect effects of each
of the four political background variables. As can be seen in Table 5, democracy proves
to have a significant total effect on GROWTH_GDP. This coefficient is negative, which
is consistent with our hypothesis that democracy has a negative impact on the growth in
developing countries. Virtually all of this comes through the direct effect of democracy
on growth. The indirect effect is very small. From the auxiliary equations we see that
\

democracy is not a significant predictor of any of the intervening variables. (Table 4)
Table 5 shows that government effectiveness (GOV_EFFECTIVENESS), on the
other hand, did not have a significant total effect on economic growth. However, the
significant coefficient for GOV-EFFECTIVENESS in the overall model proves that
government effectiveness has a significant direct effect on economic growth. Thus,
holding all other intervening variables and background variables constant,
GOV_EFFECTIVENESS affects economic growth positively. The indirect effect of
government effectiveness on economic growth proved to be negative and rather small.
From the auxiliary equations we see that government effectiveness is not a significant
predictor of any of the intervening variables.
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Economic freedom proved to have a significant total effect on economic growth.
(Table 5) The results suggest that economic freedom has an insignificant direct effect on
economic growth. However, economic freedom has a large positive indirect effect on
growth. The results from the auxiliary model show only one significant indirect path
through which economic freedom affects growth. Unexpectedly, this path is through the
effect of economic freedom on illiteracy rates. (Table 6) Thus, the results of the auxiliary
models suggest that greater economic freedom leads to greater illiteracy rates, which
subsequently leads to greater economic growth.
Political stability has a robust and significant total effect but an insignificant
direct effect on growth. These results suggest that political stability affects economic
growth indirectly by its influence on particular intervening variables. From the auxiliary
equations we see that political stability is a significant predictor of both investment rates
as well as government spending. (Table 4) The most important indirect path through
which political stability affects GROWTH_GDP is the level of investment in a country.
For example, growth rates will increase by 0.28 units solely through the influence of a
one-unit change in political stability on investment rates. A scatter diagram plotting the
data points of investment rates on the Y-axis and political stability on the X-axis is
provided below.
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Figure 3 - Scatter diagram between political stability and investment rates

\

On the other hand regression results show that growth rates will decrease by 0.097
units exclusively through the influence of political stability on government spending.
However, it can be stated that the negative impact that political stability has on
government spending is offset through its positive effects on investments. These results
substantiate the hypothesis that it is political stability, regardless of the level of
democracy, which would have the most significant effect on growth.
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CONCLUSION
In order to substantiate the hypothesis that democracy has a negative effect on
economic growth in developing countries, this study explored the effects of four kinds of
political indicators and their impact on economic growth. The political dimension that
this paper addressed was then subsequently added to the neoclassical growth model using
the following variables: level of democracy, level ofpolitical stability, level of
government effectiveness and level of economic freedom. Using a sample consisting of
data from a number of developing countries from the years 1998 and 2002, this paper
found that all the political indicators did in fact affect the economic growth through a set
of direct and indirect effects (Section V). These findings give a new perspective to
existing literature, as this paper regards democracy and political stability as independent
variables. The results have revealed a number of mechanisms that give an advantage to
countries that enjoy greater political stability.
Political instability has a signiflcant indirect effect on economic growth through
its positive effect on investment rates. The results also suggests that, counter to theory if
political stability increases by one unit, government spending will increase. However it is
important to note that this negative effect that political stability has over government
spending rates is more than compensated for by the positive effect this variable has on
investment rates.
Also, as hypothesized, democracies in developing countries were shown to have
significant negative direct and indirect effects. Thus the non-linear relationship between
democracy and growth, predicted by Barro (1996) does not seem to exist when the
sample is limited to developing countries. Government effectiveness did have a
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significant direct effect on economic growth but proved to have little effect on the
intervening variables.
Therefore to address the question that I posed at the beginning of this paper, are
policies of western countries that encourage the installation of democracy to spur growth
in countries like Somalia and Haiti of any practical use in promoting growth? No. As can
be seen in this paper, it is the level of political stability within a given country, regardless
of regime type, that results in economic growth. Thus governments and aid institutions
should give greater weight to political stability as a pre-requisite in the provision of aid
packages. Does this mean that democracy is redundant? No, for democracy is very
valuable as it guarantees basic human rights. However, this paper suggests that
democracy cannot be justified as an agent for economic growth.

\
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APPENDIX I
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Azerbaijan
Bahamas,
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Botswana
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, D
Congo, R
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivore
Cuba
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominica
Ecuador
Egypt
EI Salva
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia,
Ghana
Guatemala

Guinea
Guinea-B
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Republic
Kuwait
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius'
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay

Peru
Philippines

Puerto R
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra L
Singapore
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syrian A
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
West Bank
Yemen, R
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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